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2Foreword
The Government of Japan and the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) have a long history of collaboration which dates 
back 40 years to UNEP’s inception. 
In the aftermath of the tragic events in Japan of 11 March 2011, I am 
pleased UNEP has been able to contribute to the post-disaster effort. 
It is impossible to look at images of the devastation without feeling 
enormous sympathy for the people of Japan’s Tohoku region, who are 
still enduring great upheaval and disruption to their daily lives.
Due to its location, extent and intensity, the Great East Japan 
Earthquake has created one of the most challenging and expensive 
disaster debris management operations in history.  
This makes Japan’s clean-up efforts all the more remarkable. It has been a recovery effort around which an entire 
nation has rallied and approached with resolute determination. Following a UNEP International Expert Mission to the 
post-disaster zone, this report documents how – despite their own personal tragedies – the officials of impacted 
cities have made extraordinary progress in the past 12 months.  Commendable emphasis has been placed on 
waste segregation and recycling, and some segregated materials are already being reused.  However, the sheer 
scale of the disaster means that cleaning up the debris will take several more years.  
UNEP’s expert mission had two objectives: firstly to bring global experience in disaster response to the Japanese 
officials who are handling this massive challenge; and secondly to document and share the methods and lessons 
learned in Japan to help other countries be better prepared to handle debris generated by future natural disasters.
UNEP hopes to use data gathered by its expert mission to assist in developing an international methodology on 
estimating the volume of debris in post-disaster settings. Such a methodology would prove invaluable in terms of 
estimating the associated workload and cost of cleaning up after disasters. 
Importantly, the expert mission is also the first step in setting up an international network of disaster-debris 
management specialists, so that their knowledge and experience can be combined and made available to any 
country dealing with a future major disaster.
I look forward to UNEP’s continued collaboration with the government and people of Japan, in particular through 
UNEP’s International Environmental Technology Centre in Osaka.
Achim Steiner
United Nations Under-Secretary-General
Executive Director
United Nations Environment Programme
3Foreword
Japan experienced an unprecedented disaster in March 2011 – the 
Great East Japan Earthquake. Following the disaster, we received many 
warm messages of condolence and heartfelt support from all over the 
world. 
Now that more than one year has passed since the disaster, Japan is 
on the robust path toward reconstruction. Many new “Kizuna” (bonds 
of friendship) were born out of this process between Japan and nations 
of the world, one of which is the bond created through disaster waste 
management.
The earthquake generated tremendous amount of debris. Prompt 
management of debris is an extremely important task in the process of reconstruction. The UNEP International 
Environmental Technology Centre (IETC), with its headquarters in Osaka, has carried out diverse activities on the 
dissemination of environmental technologies since its establishment in 1992, and it offers an insight into waste 
management.  
Recently, a group of international experts, who have engaged in different disaster waste management projects, 
visited Japan and exchanged views with three affected prefectures as well as the Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
so that they could contribute to the prompt reconstruction of the affected areas.  
Because of the frequent occurrence of natural disasters, building a resilient society against natural disasters is 
more important than ever. Japan intends to share its experiences and lessons learned from this earthquake and the 
reconstruction process with the international community. Japan would like to cooperate with UNEP/IETC to make 
this newly born Kizuna of some help to reconstruction of the affected areas and to further expand the network of 
Kizuna throughout the world for facilitating more resilient society.
Koichiro Gemba
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan
4Boat swept into the centre of Ishinomaki City  
by the tsunami
5The event
On 11 March 2011, at 14:46 local time, a massive 
earthquake occurred off the Pacific coast of Japan. Its 
epicentre was approximately 70 km east of Japan’s 
Oshika Penisula, while its hypocentre was 35 km 
underwater. With a magnitude of Mw 9.0, this was the 
strongest earthquake ever to hit Japan and one of the 
five most powerful earthquakes measured in the world 
since modern record keeping began in 1900. 
Such was the earthquake’s force that it moved the 
island of Honshu – Japan’s mainland, or largest island 
– 2.4 m east, and is also believed to have shifted the 
earth on its axis by between 10 cm and 25 cm. 
The earthquake triggered a massive tsunami which 
reached Japan’s east coast in less than one hour. 
Like the earthquake, the tsunami’s severity was 
unprecedented, both in height and reach. A number 
of coastal cities were completely inundated. In the 
northern city of Miyako, the flooding from the tsunami 
reached a height of 40.5 m. In some of the rivers in 
Sendai plane, the tsunami impacts could be felt up to 
10 km upstream. 
The tsunami impacted Japan’s entire east coast, from 
Naha in Okinawa prefecture in the south to Nemuro in 
Hokkaido prefecture in the north.  However, the most 
heavily impacted areas were in the three prefectures of 
Miyagi, Fukushima and Iwate, which lay closest to the 
earthquake’s epicentre.
The earthquake also damaged the Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Plant located in the Fukushima prefecture. 
The reactors were shut-down automatically after the 
earthquake but the tsunami subsequently destroyed 
the emergency generators which were needed to cool 
the reactors. Over the following three weeks, there were 
explosions, containment vessels were damaged and 
radiation was released into the region. The Japanese 
authorities declared a 20 km radius around the 
power plant a ‘no-go’ zone and local residents were 
evacuated.
Japan is situated in a highly hazard prone area and 
has faced multiple natural disasters in the past. The 
country has developed substantial defenses against 
natural hazards, including: 
? better engineering of buildings to withstand earth-
quakes; 
? planning restrictions, such as coastal protection 
forests, physical defenses against tsunamis (solid 
brick or cement walls) and tsunami gates to pre-
vent tsunamis from entering rivers; 
? protection forests planted along the coast to form 
natural defenses against disasters;  
? early warning systems;
? designated shelters and safe areas; 
? community-based disaster response training, and 
? robust emergency response systems.
The events at the Daiichi plant were rated at level 7 on 
the International Nuclear Event Scale (representing a 
major release of radioactive material with widespread 
health and environmental consequences requiring 
implementation of extended counter measures). The 
power station was closed and is not expected to re-
open. 
Japan is considered one of the best disaster-prepared 
countries in the world. Yet the triple disaster left close 
to 20,000 people dead or missing (in total 15,854 
dead and 3,155 missing as at March 2012, according 
to official Japanese Government figures).  Hundreds 
of thousands of houses and other buildings were 
damaged and more than 400,000 people were 
displaced. With damage estimated at more than USD 
210 billion (¥16,800 billion), this event is not only tragic 
in terms of its human toll; it is the most economically 
devastating disaster in history.  
The earthquake and ensuing Tohoku tsunami have 
become collectively known as the Great East Japan 
Earthquake. Key statistics about the event are set out in 
Box 1.
6One year after the disaster, the 
environmental, economic and social 
costs are still unfolding. A number of 
communities who were uprooted from 
their coastal villages may never return to 
those areas. Some of the disaster debris 
which was washed into the sea may 
yet turn up in other countries. The final 
closure and decommissioning of the 
Daiichi reactors in Fukushima remains a 
challenge, as does the rehabilitation of 
the no-go zone around the reactor. 
The disaster and Japan’s response 
to it has been closely watched by the 
international community. The lessons 
from this disaster are expected to 
change the rules of the game in a 
number of areas, from early warning 
to improved safe operation of nuclear 
industries. 
This report focuses on the enormity of the post-disaster debris challenge and documents the response by the people 
of Japan and key learnings one year after the event.
Box 1. Great East Japan Earthquake: vital statistics
Epicentre: ...................................38° 19’ 19.2’’ N, 142° 22’ 8.4’’ E
Earthquake magnitude: ..............Mw 9.0 (1
Peak acceleration: ......................3 g 
Aftershocks: ...............................1,235
Casualities: .................................15,854 deaths (2
 3,155 missing
 26,992 injures
Building damage: ........................129,225 (fully collapsed) (2
 254,204 (half collapsed)
 691,77 (partially damaged)
Economic damage estimate: ......USD 210 billion (¥16,800 billion) (3
Sources:    1) US Geological Survey    2) National Police Agency, Japan    3) The Economist
More than 400,000 people were displaced following the triple disaster
7Such was the scale of destruction, a number of communities may never fully recover
8Mixed debris  
in Minami Sanriku
9All natural disasters – whether they involve earthquakes, 
tsunamis, floods, landslides or other natural hazards – 
result in disaster debris. Increasingly, the management 
of debris generated by natural disasters is becoming 
a major expenditure in the immediate aftermath and 
longer-term recovery effort. For example, the cost of 
handling the disaster debris following Hurricane Katrina 
exceeded USD 4 billion (¥321.7 billion) in a post-
disaster recovery effort which lasted more than three 
years.
The debris generated by tsunamis is often more 
complicated to handle than other types of debris. This 
is due to a number of factors, including:
1. Tsunamis tend to move a substantial amount of 
debris from its original location, making the task of 
identifying and recovering the material by its owners 
extremely difficult;
The debris challenge
Professor Toshiaki Yoshioka
Tohoku University, Sendai, and member 
of Japan’s Task Force on Disaster Debris 
Management
“Due to a shortage of land, waste management in 
Japan is a challenge even during normal periods. 
The generation of large quantities of disaster 
debris thus makes the entire operation extremely 
challenging, both technically and financially.”
The disaster generated an unprecedented volume of debris which will take several years to clean up
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2. Tsunami waves mix up materials from everything in 
their path, causing various kinds of debris – from 
hazardous to non hazardous, biodegradable and 
recyclable to non-recyclable waste – to be combined 
into piles. This can cause entire mounds of debris 
to deteriorate rapidly, making recovery and recycling 
more difficult;
3. The debris is washed with salt water increasing 
corrosion and degradation in the short term 
and making downstream processing, such as 
incineration and biodegradation, more difficult;
4. Massive quantities of debris will often be carried 
back into the sea along with the return waves, 
whereby the heavy materials will be deposited in the 
coastal area and lighter materials will tend to float 
out to sea where they can remain for months or 
even years, causing hazards to marine life as well as 
affecting the shipping and fishing industries; and
5. Tsunami waves can also carry large volumes of 
marine sediments inland.  Depending on the quality 
of the sediment and where it has been deposited, 
this may also need to be handled as disaster debris.
Tohoku tsunami
Due to its location, extent and intensity, the Tohoku 
tsunami has created one of the most challenging disaster 
debris management operations. It encompassed all 
of the characteristics mentioned above. Anything 
standing in its way – from boats to trees to concrete 
bridges, tsunami gates, trains, automobiles, houses, 
supermarkets and schools – was swept up and moved, 
often by several hundred metres or more, and converted 
in an instant into disaster waste. 
Large quantities of sediments, often up to 20 percent 
of the total debris estimate for an impacted city, were 
deposited on the land and an unknown quantity of 
debris was carried back into the ocean.
Along the Tohoku coast, as cities were decimated 
or even wiped out, landscapes and seascapes were 
strewn with debris of an order of magnitude and nature 
that nobody could have prepared for. In the city of 
Ishinomaki, the tsunami produced an estimated 6.15 
million tons of debris which was equivalent to 103 
years of solid waste production in that city in normal 
circumstances. The situation in other cities was similar, 
although variable in scale.
While the challenge caused by the tsunami debris was 
both massive and complex, it was also urgent.  As 
tsunamis often carry victims along with the debris, it 
is important that the piles of debris are inspected for 
any human remains. Initially, debris had to be moved 
into the streets so that both rescue workers and 
communities could gain access to the affected areas.  
At the same time, survivors of a tsunami also need 
to be given an option to look through the debris to 
recover any items of practical or personal value (such 
as documents, albums and toys). However, once this 
is done, the debris needs to be moved as quickly as 
possible to prevent it from degrading at the site and to 
facilitate emotional and practical recovery. It is important 
for the emotional well-being of the communities who 
remain in the location to see that the remnants of the 
destructive event are removed from the location as 
soon as possible. Reconstruction can only begin once 
the debris has been removed.
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Source: Sendai City Waste Management Guidelines for Great East Japan Earthquake, Environmental Bureau, City of Sendai, January 2012
Prefecture Local Government
Amount of 
waste (tons) Prefecture
Local 
Government
Amount of 
waste (tons) Prefecture
Local 
Government
Amount of 
waste (tons)
Iw
at
e
Hirono 15,000
M
iy
ag
i
Sendai 1,352,000
Fu
ku
sh
im
a
Iwaki 880,000
Kuji 96,000 Ishinomaki 6,163,000 Soma 217,000
Noda 140,000 Shiogama 251,000 Minami Soma 640,000
Fudai 19,000 Kesen-Numa 1,367,000 Shinchi 167,000
Tanohata 86,000 Natori 636,000 Hirono 25,000
Iwaizumi 42,000 Tagajyo 550,000 Naraha 58,000
Miyako 751,000 Iwanuma 520,000 Tomioka 49,000
Yamada 399,000
Higashi-
Matsushima
1,657,000 Ohkuma 37,000
Ohtsuchi 709,000 Watari 1,267,000 Futaba 60,000
Kamaishi 762,000 Yamamoto 533,000 Namie 147,000
Ofunato 752,000 Matsushima 43,000
Rikuzen 1,016,000 Shichigahama 333,000
Rifu 15,000
Onagawa 444,000
Minami 
Sanriku
56,000
Total 4,755,000 Total 15,691,000 Total 2,280,000
Table 1.  Waste volumes in selected impacted cities
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The use of heavy mechanization was a key feature  
of the response effort
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While the disaster debris management challenge was 
both daunting and urgent, for Japanese Government 
agencies, from the municipal to national level, this was 
one of multiple issues that had to be addressed in the 
wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake. The enormity 
of the challenge was most acute at the municipal level 
where the harsh reality was that in many cases the 
officials who would normally have been responsible for 
waste management were either killed or traumatized by 
the loss of family or friends or the destruction of property. 
The emotional mindset of the officials who remained and 
had to face the deconstruction of entire cities can only be 
imagined by those who were not present.
Japan has three tiers of government: national, prefecture 
and municipal. According to the law, waste management 
issues are dealt with at the municipal level with technical 
and financial support from the relevant prefecture 
government. While arguably more emotionally detached, 
officials at the national level also had serious challenges to 
overcome. It was evident from the scale of the destruction 
that the local and prefecture governments in the affected 
areas would be unable to respond to the disaster on their 
own. Thus, human, technical and financial resources had 
to be found at a time when the disaster caused a massive 
blow to Japan’s economy. With every municipality 
needing technical support, the resources of national 
ministries were stretched to the limit. Meanwhile, the 
unfolding crisis at the Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, with 
its global implications, also demanded the attention of 
officials in the national government. 
Despite these extraordinary circumstances, it is to the 
credit of Japan’s Ministry of the Environment that they 
quickly identified dealing with the debris as a major 
post-disaster challenge and formed a Task Force on 
Disaster Debris Management. This consisted of more 
than 100 experts from government agencies, research 
institutions, academia and industry. Individual technical 
experts from various offices within the ministry were 
deployed to back-up and strengthen those prefecture 
The Japanese Government’s  
response
and municipality offices which were trying to address 
the disaster debris. On 16 May 2011, just two months 
after the event, the Ministry of the Environment came 
with clear guidance notes for the municipalities on how 
to deal with the disaster debris. 
The ministry’s guidelines laid out the key activities to 
be undertaken in each municipality to deal with the 
disaster debris. This ensured there was consistency 
in the overall approach to the clean-up, segregation, 
offsite transportation and final disposal of debris. The 
guidelines emphasized the importance of maximizing 
recycling opportunities. They also requested local 
governments to ensure efficiency in contract 
management and the maximization of local employment 
in disaster debris management. 
Recognizing that many municipalities would be unable 
to handle the volumes of disaster debris without 
assistance, the guidelines promoted collaboration 
between municipalities at the prefecture level, as well as 
Chihori Kikuchi
Coordinator, Japan International Cooperation 
Centre
“As a victim of this disaster, I have been glad 
and honoured to see the progress with recovery 
efforts in the affected areas for myself. I hope our 
experiences will be of value to other countries in 
the future.”
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Guidance notes provided by Japan’s Ministry of the Environment advised municipalities on segregating debris
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cross-jurisdictional involvement between prefectures. The 
guidelines also set an ambitious schedule to achieve initial 
clean-up, segregation and final disposal of disaster debris, 
with the management of disaster debris to be completed 
by the end of 2014 – or three years after the tsunami.
The guidelines also recommended increased subsidies 
to local municipalities to help them deal with disaster 
debris and requested the issuance of bonds by the 
municipalities to bridge any funding shortfalls. 
The disaster waste guidelines from the ministry, 
together with the technical experts deployed in the field, 
essentially formed the foundation for the post-disaster 
debris management operation. The guidelines were 
then implemented by the municipalities, often with the 
support of the prefecture governments. There was 
greater involvement by prefecture governments in cases 
where the municipalities had limited local capacity or 
where the local resources were totally overwhelmed by 
the scale of the disaster.
Table 2.  Recommended approaches to disaster debris management
Sl # Debris category Suggested approach
1 Combustible waste After shredding, use for cement calcination process and power generation wherever possible
2 Waste wood Expose the wood to rain to wash out the salt to meet user requirements
Mainly use for making multi-purpose wooden boards and as fuel for boilers and power generation
Copper chrome arsenate (CCA) treated wood should be incinerated at waste treatment facilities
3 Non-combustible waste Separate from combustible waste and dispose of at landfill sites
4 Scrap metal Should be recycled after separating ferrous and non-ferrous metals whenever possible
5 Waste concrete Should be separated into asphalts, concrete, stone and other materials 
Should preferably be used as materials for reconstruction in the impacted areas
6 Home appliances and 
automobiles
Items should be separated to the extent possible (televisions, air-conditioners, washing machines, 
dryer and refrigerators)
Should be managed under relevant Designated Home Appliances Recycling Act 1998
Automobiles should be delivered to collection companies for recycling pursuant to the End-of-Life 
Vehicle Recycling law 2002
7 Watercraft Ships should be dismantled after removing fuel and batteries
Scrap metal should be recycled
Waste plastic and wood must be incinerated and used for power generation, to the extent possible
Parts of vessels containing asbestos should be disposed of according to the specified procedures for 
asbestos-contaminated waste
8 Hazardous wastes Waste containing asbestos, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and other hazardous substances should 
be separated from other waste, treated as a discreet category of specially-controlled waste, and 
disposed of according to its properties
9 Tsunami sediments Materials containing toxic substances (i.e. heavy metals), perishable combustible materials and 
sediments containing oil should be used as raw materials of cement or subjected to incineration for 
landfill
Other materials with similar properties to water botton sand should be segregated from foreign 
matter and used as backfill in ground subsidence areas, recycled into civil engineering materials or 
placed into the ocean
10 Waste at post-fire sites At sites affected by fires, ash should be segregated from scrap metal and waste concrete
Ash, along with tsunami sediments mixed with ash, should be molten or disposed of in landfills at 
final disposal sites, deemed suitable based on the detected dioxin levels
Source:  Guidelines (Master Plan) for Disaster Waste Management after the Great East Japan Earthquake, Ministry of the Environment, May 2011
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Members of the UNEP mission team are briefed  
during a visit to Ishinomaki
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The ongoing post-disaster debris management 
operation in Japan is the largest in recent history. In 
light of this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt there 
was an opportunity to exchange experiences between 
international and Japanese experts in disaster waste 
management.
Following the earthquake and tsunami in March 2011, 
the UNEP’s Executive Director, Achim Steiner, wrote 
to Japan’s Prime Minister, His Excellency Naoto Kan, 
expressing condolences and offering UNEP’s expertise 
and availability to assist in any way. In May 2011, UNEP 
participated in a visit to the tsunami-impacted region 
arranged by the Asia Disaster Reduction Centre at the 
behest of the foreign affairs ministry.
The International Environmental Technology Centre of 
UNEP is based in Japan and waste management is 
among its core areas of expertise. UNEP’s Post-Conflict 
and Disaster Management Branch, based in Geneva, 
has extensive experience in post-crisis environmental 
assessment and clean up efforts. For example, UNEP 
was involved in post-disaster debris management 
following the 2004 South-East Asian Tsunami, the 2005 
Pakistan earthquake, Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar and 
the Wenchuan Earthquake in China in 2008, as well as 
the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.  
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was 
therefore invited by the foreign affairs ministry to facilitate 
an experience sharing mission. The government’s 
request to UNEP had three distinct elements:
1. Facilitating a mission of experts with post-disaster 
debris management expertise from around the world 
to visit selected municipalities dealing with the task 
of post-tsunami debris management;
2. Preparing a documentary on the visit for information, 
dissemination and training purposes internationally; 
and
3. Participating in various events organized by the 
Government of Japan on post-disaster recovery to 
present the expert mission’s findings.
Mission team
UNEP formed an international team of senior experts 
from the USA, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Switzerland and St Lucia. They were joined by a 
member of Japan’s Task Force on Debris Management 
and UNEP officials. Details of mission team and their 
areas of expertise are presented in Table 3.
UNEP’s International Expert  
Mission
Muralee Thummarukudy
Chief, UNEP Disaster Risk Reduction 
Mission leader
“The ongoing disaster debris management 
in Japan is the world’s single largest waste 
management operation, surpassing Hurricane 
Katrina. It is therefore appropriate that such 
a process is informed by the international 
experiences and that we document lessons from 
this operation for use elsewhere.”
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Table 3.  Participants in the International Expert Mission
Expert Designation Main expertise Experience in post-crisis 
settings
Muralee Thummarukudy (Mission Team Leader)
Chief of Disaster Risk 
Reduction, Post-Conflict and 
Disaster Management Branch, 
UNEP, Switzerland
Post-disaster response, 
strategic planning of debris 
management, environmental 
assessment, financing, 
contracting, disaster risk 
reduction
Cyclone Nargis, Wenchuan 
Earthquake, Haiti earthquake, 
Thailand floods, oil spills
Surya Chandak (Mission coordinator)
Senior Programme Officer, 
International Environmental 
Technology Centre, UNEP, Japan
Waste-to-energy, cleaner 
production
South-East Asian Tsunami of 
2004
Professor Toshiaki Yoshioka Professor, Tohoku University, 
Sendai, Japan
Environmental impact 
assessment, waste 
management
Great East Japan Earthquake 
and tsunami, 2011
Ronnie Crossland Associate Director of 
Disaster Preparedness, US 
Environmental Protection 
Agency, USA
Contingency planning for 
waste management, onsite 
assessment, clean-up, debris 
management
United States (many disasters 
including hurricanes Katrina, 
Gustave, Ike and Rita), 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill
Thorsten Kallnischkies Independent consultant to the 
UN, The World Bank and the 
Government of Germany
Management of landfills, 
industrial waste management, 
landfill design and operation, 
contracting for waste 
management
Includes post-crisis response in 
Ukraine, Dominican Republic, 
Mexico, Lebanon, Nigeria
Yves Barthelemy Head of Geomatics Department, 
Paris Est University, 
Ecole Superieure Ingenieurs, 
France
Disaster waste estimation, 
siting of new landfills, 
environmental assessment of 
landfills, use of geographic 
information system (GIS) 
for waste management and 
tracking
Post-crisis response in 
Myanmar, Lebanon, Iraq, 
Rwanda, Congo, Ecuador, 
Tanzania
Mike Cowing Independent consultant to the 
UN and The World Bank
Waste segregation and 
recycling, landfill design and 
operation, healthcare waste 
management
Includes post-crisis response 
in China, the Caribbean 
(post hurricane), Haiti (post 
earthquake), Russia, Indonesia, 
Sri Lanka
David Smith Director, LilQuest Waste 
Assessment and Handling 
Company, United Kingdom
Assessment and clean-up of 
hazardous wastes, asbestos
Post-crisis response in 
Indonesia, China, Lebanon, 
Nigeria and the United Kingdom
Mario Burger Head, Physics, Speiz Laboratory, 
Switzerland
Environmental monitoring, 
radiation assessment
Includes post-crisis response in 
Iraq, Kuwait, Serbia, Nigeria
19
Map 1. The sites visited during the UNEP International Expert Mission,  
 conducted from 27 February-5 March 2011
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Mission activities
UNEP’s international expert mission was conducted in 
two phases. During the preparatory phase, the team of 
experts collected all relevant background information 
about the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami, 
including satellite images and government documents. 
A preliminary visit was undertaken by UNEP officials to 
some of the selected municipalities to scope the main 
mission and examine logistics.
Phase two was the mission itself which involved 
detailed coordination with government authorities at 
all levels. Five municipalities were chosen to provide 
sufficient geographic diversity and to expose the 
experts to the different scale and nature of disaster 
debris problems faced by the municipalities, as well as 
the range of solutions being tested. The impacted cities 
visited during the expert mission were:
● Sendai City
● Miyako City
● Ofunato City
● Ishinomaki City
● Soma City
In addition, a recycling facility in Tokyo where the 
disaster debris is being received was also visited. 
The activities of the mission team at each site included 
the following:
● A meeting with the city officials dealing with debris 
management;
● A visit to the storage areas as well as any treatment, 
recycling, re-use and disposal facilities, making 
observations and notes, and exchanging ideas with 
technicians on the ground; and
● A close-out meeting with experts and city officials 
were experiences were exchanged in a structured 
manner.
The mission team was accompanied by a film crew 
and photographer from the Sendai Broadcasting 
Corporation who were contracted by UNEP to 
document the entire mission.  The team also met 
briefly with Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, The 
Honourable Koichiro Gemba, and gave him feedback 
about the mission’s observations. The mission 
concluded with a press conference at the Japan 
National Press Club in Tokyo as well as a briefing 
in Osaka where experts from various national and 
international organizations were invited to discuss the 
mission team’s preliminary observations. It was not 
part of the scope of UNEP’s mission to visit the Daiichi 
power plant or its exclusion zone, nor to examine the 
Japanese Government’s plans to dispose of radiation-
contaminated debris.  
Yukiko Fujimura
Freelance journalist
“Having reported on the disaster when it 
occurred, it was meaningful for me to cover the 
UNEP Expert Mission one year later and see 
the changes and ongoing challenges at familiar 
places and to know how local municipalities are 
dealing with them.”
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Initial meeting for the UNEP International Expert Mission in Sendai
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Stack of two-wheel vehicles in Sendai City awaiting 
identification by their owners
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Situated 87 km west of the earthquake’s epicentre, the 
first tsunami wave struck the Sendai coast at 15:30. As 
of March 2012, there were 704 people confirmed dead 
and 26 missing out of the city’s total population of more 
than one million people. Estimates from Sendai municipal 
authorities indicate the disaster produced 1.35 million 
tons of debris and some 1.3 million tons of tsunami 
sediment in Sendai alone. Close to 246,628 houses were 
damaged. Other vital statistics about the city of Sendai 
with reference to the tsunami are presented in Table 4.
The management of tsunami debris is ongoing in 
Sendai. Almost all loose debris from the impacted 
areas has been collected and moved to interim and 
final storage locations. Three new incinerators, with a 
combined capacity of processing 480 t/day of debris, 
were commissioned within four months of the disaster 
and are now fully operational. The municipality has 
commenced shipping damaged automobiles from a 
central storage area for final processing.
Sendai had a number of advantages compared to 
other municipalities in terms of disaster debris handling. 
To begin with, Sendai had a contingency plan for 
disaster debris management. Even though the scale 
of the disaster far outstripped the scope of the city’s 
contingency plan, having such a document in place 
enabled the municipal authorities to quickly adapt it to 
the new situation. 
Being a large municipality, Sendai also had an 
established environment department which could deal 
with many of the technical challenges posed by the 
disaster. The presence of Tohoku University in Sendai 
further enabled the municipality to access technical 
expertise to supplement their existing staff.
The municipality prepared waste management 
guidelines with the basic objective to “remove all 
disaster waste within a year and to dispose of all 
waste within three years”, as well as seeking to rebuild 
Table 4. Tsunami-related facts and 
 statistics for Sendai City
the local economy by utilizing local businesses. 
What is interesting about the Sendai Disaster Waste 
Management Guidelines for the Great East Japan 
Earthquake is that in addition to the collection and 
handling of disaster debris, they also provide guidance 
on other important, related aspects such as:
● Maintaining hygienic environmental conditions and 
prompt restoration of the livelihoods of citizens, 
which includes a contingency plan to restore the 
daily waste collection and disposal service as soon 
as possible;
● Environmental safety and work security, which 
includes ensuring that the debris management 
does not create additional health or safety hazards, 
including traffic congestion; and
● Specifications about maximizing local business 
opportunities (for e.g. all vehicles to be hired were 
prescribed to be only from the Sendai municipality).
Sendai’s three principal disaster debris management 
sites are located on the coast: Gamo, Arahama and 
Ido. They are being managed by private contractors 
under the supervision of the Sendai Municipality. The 
UNEP mission team was given an overview of the three 
facilities, and visited one of the locations, at Arahama.
Sendai City
Parameter Value
Location Sendai City
Prefecture Miyagi
Population at the time of the event 1,0456,000
Estimated quantity of tsunami debris 1.35 million tons
Number of automobiles damaged 9,700
Number of storage facilities established 3
Total incineration capacity 480 t/day
Waste exported outside 10,000 tons 
Estimated cost of debris management USD 1.15 billion
(¥92.5 billion)
Ongoing monitoring Radiation and asbestos
Health and safety incidents related to 
debris management
None recorded
Source: Sendai City Municipal Government, 2012
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At the site visited, the mission team found that good 
health and safety arrangements were in place, including 
fencing, visitor registration, personal protective 
equipment arrangements for staff and visitors, and 
good traffic management. 
Waste was segregated into various piles, consistent 
with the national guidelines. The results of daily radiation 
monitoring were displayed outside the facility. 
The pile heights were of medium scale compared to 
those in other impacted cities, and therefore Sendai 
was not experiencing an accumulation of methane gas 
and spontaneous combustion was reported in some of 
the other municipalities visited. 
Compared to major disaster sites elsewhere in the 
world, the mission team concluded that the amount of 
hazardous waste generated in Sendai did not appear 
to be significant, probably as the areas impacted were 
more residential than industrial. However, the hazardous 
materials that had been collected here were being kept 
in the open, sometimes simply under tarpaulins. 
The mission team felt the management of hazardous 
waste at this site could be improved, preferably by 
moving it to an offsite location with more secure 
containment and roofing which would ensure the safety 
of the materials as well as the health of staff working 
on-site. The storage of automobiles, and in particular 
two-wheelers, could also be improved as they were 
stacked without first removing the fuel.
Pile of tyres at Arahama
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In some cases, potentially hazardous materials were kept in the open
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A shipment of mixed tsunami debris  
leaves Miyako for Tokyo
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Miyako is a small municipality located 150 km north-west of 
the 2011 earthquake’s epicenter.  The city had a population 
of 40,769 at the time of the event. The first tsunami wave 
arrived at 15:26 on 11 March.  A total of 526 people have 
since been confirmed dead, with 114 missing. Some 4,859 
houses were damaged. The total volume of post-disaster 
debris is estimated at 574,900 tons. See also Table 5.
The expert mission observed that almost all loose 
debris from the impacted area had been collected and 
moved to a final storage location. The material had been 
sorted into major separate categories such as wood, 
automobiles, housing appliances, traditional beds 
(tatami), fishing nets and building debris, consistent with 
the national guidelines. The pile heights were of medium 
scale compared to those in other impacted cities, 
and the city was not experiencing an accumulation of 
methane gas and spontaneous combustion as was 
reported in some of the other municipalities visited.
Being a fishing village, there was a notably large mound 
of fishing nets. As the nets had become fully entangled, 
separating them for disposal was not practical. The 
fishing nets are mostly made out of nylon which is 
not biodegradable and although their storage had not 
caused a safety hazard to date, officials were hopeful of 
Miyako City
Table 5. Tsunami-related facts and 
 statistics for Miyako City
Parameter Value
Location Miyako City
Prefecture Iwate
Population at the time of the event 40,769
Estimated quantity of tsunami debris 574,000 tons
Number of automobiles damaged 3,000
Number of storage facilities established 1
Total incineration capacity 90-95 t/day
Waste exported outside 1,900 tons 
Estimated cost of debris management USD 120 million
(¥9.653 million)
Ongoing monitoring Radiation and asbestos
Health and safety incidents related to 
debris management
None recorded
Source: Miyako City Municipal Government, 2012
finding a suitable solution. (This was a common issue in 
a number of other coastal municipalities where fishing 
or oyster farming was a dominant economic activity). 
A large pile of mixed debris was still being manually 
segregated at a new sorting plant. An incinerator with 
a capacity of 90-95 t/day is being established. Miyako 
City is also exporting disaster debris to Tokyo.
Being a small municipality, Miyako officials have 
had significant technical and financial constraints in 
dealing with disaster debris. The municipality is being 
supported by Iwate prefecture officials on technical and 
administrative matters regarding debris management. 
The municipality has ensured that local employment 
is maximized and approximately 100 local people are 
currently employed at the Miyako site involved in various 
stages of disaster debris management. 
At the storage, sorting and disposal site visited, there 
were good health and safety arrangements in place, 
including fencing, visitor logging, personal protective 
arrangements for staff and visitors and good traffic 
management. The results of daily radiation monitoring 
were displayed outside the facility.
David Smith
Hazardous waste expert
“There had been no decline in the health and 
safety standards and typically this is not the case. 
In many other situations, due to the emergency 
nature of the operation, the health and safety 
standards are relaxed, exposing workers to 
unnecessary danger.”
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Disposing of fishing nets has been a major issue  
in many coastal communities
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Ofunato City
Ofunato is a small municipality located 100 km north-
west of the earthquake’s epicentre. It had a population 
of 40,769 at the time of the event. The first tsunami 
wave arrived in the city of Ofunato at 14:54 – within eight 
minutes of the earthquake. As of March 2012, there 
were 340 people confirmed dead and 84 still missing. 
According to official figures from the municipal 
government, the earthquake and tsunami damaged 
5,387 houses and the event generated an estimated 
756,000 tons of debris. See also Table 6.
The mission team observed that almost all loose debris 
from the impacted area had been collected but was not 
yet fully consolidated at one location. The debris was 
segregated into many different piles according to the 
guidelines of the national government. Fishing nets were 
a major issue here also with no known plan for their 
disposal. 
A dedicated site for storing hazardous materials had not 
been damaged by the tsunami. As its roof and concrete 
floor were in tact, a range of waste – from pesticides to 
PCB containing transformers – was being stored there 
with good safety signage.
Ofunato City is home to a major cement industry, the 
Taiheiyo Cement Corporation. Its facility was flooded 
and partly damaged by the tsunami. However, the 
cement plant was rapidly put back into operation and 
one of its kilns was converted into an incineration plant. 
Consequently, the facility is able to process around 
1,000 t/day of combustible tsunami debris. The cement 
plant has also set up a de-salting plant to wash the 
tsunami debris so that it can be used as fuel for cement 
generation, maximizing the economic value of utilization. 
At the main storage and handling site visited, there 
were good health and safety arrangements in place, 
including fencing, visitor logging, personal protective 
arrangements for staff and visitors and good traffic 
management. Daily radiation checks were being done 
and the results were made publicly available. 
Table 6. Tsunami-related facts and 
 statistics for Ofunato City
Parameter Value
Location Ofunato City
Prefecture Iwate
Population at the time of the event 40,769
Estimated quantity of tsunami debris 756,000 tons
Number of automobiles damaged 4,777
Number of storage facilities established 20
Total incineration capacity 1,000 t/day
Waste exported outside None 
Estimated cost of debris management USD 5.15 million
(¥414 million)
Ongoing monitoring Radiation and asbestos
Health and safety incidents related to 
debris management
None recorded
Source: Ofunato City Municipal Government, 2012
Mario Burger
Spiez Laboratory
“There was systematic monitoring of 
environmental components in and around the 
waste management centres, which was also 
made available to the public. This is one practice 
which could be followed elsewhere.”
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An incinerator under construction in Ishinomaki  
is due to be the largest in Japan
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Ishinomaki is a medium-sized municipality located 95 
km west of the earthquake’s epicentre.  Predominantly 
a fishing centre, it had a population of 162,822 at the 
time of the event. The first tsunami wave arrived in 
Ishinomaki at 15:26. The tsunami left the city and its 
residents completely devastated. As of March 2012, 
there were 3,280 people confirmed dead and 595 
missing. An estimated 6.16 million tons of debris was 
generated with some 53,742 buildings damaged. 
While all of the urban areas along the Tohoku coast 
were overwhelmed by the amount of tsunami debris, 
the situation was most grave in the city of Ishinomaki, 
which suffered the most casualties, the greatest 
destruction of houses and the highest volume of debris 
of all the municipalities.   
It was estimated that the debris produced on 11 
March 2011 was equivalent to the volume of waste 
which would usually have been generated by the 
city over a 103-year period. The local capacities – 
technically, administratively and financially – were totally 
overwhelmed by the destruction and scale of the 
challenge. See also Table 7.
Table 7. Tsunami-related facts and 
 statistics for Ishinomaki City
Parameter Value
Location Ishinomaki City
Prefecture Miyagi
Population at the time of the event 162,822
Estimated quantity of tsunami debris 6.16 million tons
Number of automobiles damaged 21,038
Number of storage facilities established 23
Total incineration capacity 1,500 t/day
Waste exported outside None 
Estimated cost of debris management USD 262.5 million
(¥21,115.5 million)
Ongoing monitoring Radiation and asbestos
Health and safety incidents related to 
debris management
Roll-over of vehicles
Source: Ishinomaki City Municipal Government, 2012
Ishinomaki City
The debris management effort in Ishinomaki is being 
handled jointly by the municipality and the Miyagi 
prefecture. Experts from the federal Ministry of the 
Environment have also been posted there to provide 
technical backstopping as needed.
To the credit of local officials, in just 12 months almost 
all loose debris from the impacted area has been 
collected and moved to interim storage locations. The 
material has been segregated into categories such as 
wood, automobiles, housing appliances, traditional 
beds (tatami) and building debris. There is a large 
storage yard containing fresh timber collected from a 
protection forest which was overrun by the tsunami.
Ishinomaki officials are considering all possible avenues 
for disaster debris management to overcome the huge 
challenge posed. The sheer volume of debris remains 
a significant hurdle for local officials.  Spontaneous fires 
had occurred in some of the mixed waste piles. While 
passive venting systems have been put in place, fire 
Matthew Gubb
Director, UNEP International Environmental  
Technology Centre
“Japan has been able quickly to apply technology 
solutions to the tsunami debris, for example, 
constructing the country’s largest incineration 
facility and installing waste sorting equipment at 
an impressive speed.”
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hazard remains a threat which will become acute in the 
summer.
An incineration facility, the biggest in Japan (with a 
processing capacity of 1,500 t/day) consisting of 
multiple incinerator modules, is being set up and is 
expected to be operational by August 2012. The 
municipality has received agreement from the national 
government to use part of the disaster debris and 
the incinerator ash for land reclamation within the 
Ishinomaki port. Once the local paper mill damaged in 
the earthquake is operating again, it is likely that large 
quantities of the raw wood will be sent there for use 
after salt levels in the wood have dropped to acceptable 
levels.
At the incineration facility visited, there were good health 
and safety arrangements in place, including fencing, 
visitor registration, personal protective equipment 
arrangements for the staff and visitors. 
The destruction of coastal forests by the tsunami created piles of timber which are now used for a range of purposes
33
Fast-paced construction at Ishinomaki
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The tsunami produced an estimated 217,319 tons of debris  
in Soma City alone
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Soma City is the smallest of the municipalities visited by 
UNEP’s expert team and is primarily a fishing and farming 
centre. Its population at the time of the disaster was 
38,042 people.  It is located in the Fukushima prefecture, 
134 km south west of the earthquake’s epicentre. The 
first tsunami wave arrived in Soma at 15:53. As of March 
2011, there were 458 people confirmed dead. 
The municipal government estimates that some 4,141 
houses were damaged and that the tsunami produced some 
217,319 tons of debris. Other vital statistics about Soma City 
with reference to the tsunami is presented in Table 8.
As the city is located in Fukushima prefecture, the staff 
have been working under severe constraints as there 
has been strong resistance both locally and nationally to 
the treatment and disposal of debris given concerns over 
possible radiation contamination. As a consequence, 
Soma is lagging behind the other cities visited by 
the UNEP expert mission in terms of progress with 
establishing facilities for waste treatment and the volume 
of debris handled.  At the time of the expert mission, the 
segregation of debris was still at an early stage, with the 
transfer of debris to a storage facility mostly complete.
Table 8. Tsunami-related facts and 
 statistics for Soma City
Parameter Value
Location Soma City
Prefecture Fukushima
Population at the time of the event 38,042
Estimated quantity of tsunami debris 217,319 tons
Number of automobiles damaged 650
Number of storage facilities established 1
Total incineration capacity None
Waste exported outside None 
Estimated cost of debris management USD 120 million
(¥9.653 million)
Ongoing monitoring Radiation and asbestos
Health and safety incidents related to 
debris management
None
Source: Soma City Municipal Government, 2012
Soma City
Kazuko Uwasu
Programme Assistant, UNEP International 
Environmental Technology Centre
“As a Japanese national, accompanying 
the International Expert Mission gave me an 
opportunity to see first-hand the scale of the 
challenge. I was proud of the way officials at local 
municipalities have been handling this challenge, 
in spite of personal tragedies and shock.”
Other than the storage area, the only facility which had 
been established was a small sorting plant to segregate 
the mixed debris.  
At the storage, sorting and disposal site visited, 
the expert team observed good health and safety 
arrangements in place, including fencing, visitor logging, 
personal protective arrangements for staff and visitors 
and good traffic management. 
Tsunami sediment remains a major issue in Soma. Unlike 
smaller municipalities in the north of Japan which are 
primarily fishing-based communities, Soma also had a 
strong agricultural base. As the area features coastal 
plains, the tsunami sediments reached more than a 
kilometre inland, and in some cases inundated farmlands. 
Due to concerns about radioactive pollution and other 
contamination, all the sediments are being scraped off 
the surface of the farmlands. However, at the time of the 
mission this material did not have a designated end point.
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Debris from Miyako is unloaded at the  
Recycle Peer Company in Tokyo
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Recognizing that the debris generated by the Great 
East Japan Earthquake was on such an enormous 
scale that the affected municipalities could not deal 
with it alone, the national government called upon other 
municipalities for support. 
Tokyo is one of the municipalities which agreed to 
accept disaster debris and has been doing so since 
November 2011. The waste is being sent from Miyako 
and received at the Recycle Peer Company which is 
located in Super Ecotown on the outskirts of Tokyo. 
(See Map 2). The Recycle Peer Company has an 
installed capacity of 900 t/day and its primarily focus 
is on construction debris. Most of the activities in the 
facility are mechanized.
The debris, which is being received here are containers 
of mixed combustible waste. The debris is packed into 
containers, which are initially shipped by road, then 
by train and finally by road before they arrive at the 
processing facility. Currently they receive about 100 
tons of debris per day. The waste is incinerated and the 
ash will be used for road construction.
Due to nationwide concern over the possibility that the 
disaster debris may have been contaminated by the 
fallout of radiological contamination from Fukushima, 
substantial precaution is being taken during the waste 
management supply chain. The container is inspected 
at the place of origin for its radiation levels and is 
shipped only if the levels are below the permitted levels. 
The level of radiation is once again tested upon arrival at 
the Recycle Peer Company and is accepted only if the 
radiation levels are below permitted levels. It must be 
added that no shipment had to be stopped or rejected 
due to radiation concerns since the work started.
The government is also taking considerable effort to 
reassure the public about the safety of the shipments. 
The radiation readings taken in Miyako before the 
shipment leaves the city is uploaded onto the website of 
Tokyo municipality and is available before the shipment 
arrives. Public meetings were held in the community to 
explain all of the precautions being taken.
In spite of the above, there is significant public concern 
and resistance to the idea of waste shipment in Japan. 
While the UNEP expert team felt that all due diligence 
precautions were being taken by the government in 
ensuring that such shipments were safe, the team 
also felt that shipping the disaster debris hundreds of 
kilometres by road in small containers may not be the 
most appropriate method to deal with such debris, 
environmentally or economically. 
In addition, the quantities being shipped are insignificant 
compared to the scale of the debris remaining at the 
impacted areas. While there may be strong rationale from 
a national perspective to facilitate such inter-municipality 
waste transfer, a more practical, environmentally friendly 
and cost effective approach may be to augment the 
disaster debris handling capacity in the coastline. 
Tokyo
38
Map 2. The route for transporting mixed combustible waste from Miyako  
 to Tokyo for final treatment and disposal
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An example of the environmental monitoring results displayed publicly outside debris processing centres
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Year 1 – Red
Year 2 – Orange
Year 3 – Yellow
Year 4 – Blue
Year 5 – Violet
Image courtesy of Google Earth
The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
simulation of the possible circulation in the Pacific Ocean  
of debris generated by the Great East Japan Earthquake
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Among the most visually stunning and disturbing 
images of the Japan tsunami were those showing the 
sheer volume of debris being swept up by returning 
waves and pulled out to sea. Such was the power of 
the tsunami that the debris included fishing boats, entire 
houses and everything in between. Large numbers 
of cars could also be seen floating in coastal waters. 
Within days of the tsunami, the patches of disaster 
debris floating off Japan’s coast were so large they were 
visible on satellite images.
Much of the heavy debris, such as automobiles, would 
have sunk to the seabed off the coast in the immediate 
aftermath of the disaster. Staff at a number of the 
municipalities visited during the UNEP mission mentioned 
they were aware of the presence of sunken debris along 
the coastline and at their ports. Many municipalities plan 
to recover at least the debris which ended up within their 
port facilities or which is considered likely to interfere with 
shipping or fisheries. Limited dredging has already been 
undertaken in Ofunato.
The masses of floating debris have since spread to a 
much larger area, aided by wind and currents. There are 
numerous mathematical ocean current-based models 
which predict that these patches of marine debris will 
eventually be washed over onto the west coast of North 
America and also onto South Pacific islands. It is already 
known that the debris is no longer moving in single or 
multiple spectacular patches and is unlikely to arrive on 
any coastline in a sudden and dramatic fashion. 
Both the US Environmental Protection Agency and 
US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) have been proactively looking for any signs of 
the debris arriving on US shores, as have the Canadian 
authorities. The US authorities have also committed to 
collect and return to Japan any debris which is clearly 
identifiable as being of Japanese origin and that may 
have sentimental value. As of early May 2012, debris 
suspected to be from the tsunami had washed up on 
The debris that floated away
the coastline of Alaska and Washington state, among 
other areas, and was being documented. 
Marine debris has been an environmental issue at the 
forefront of international concern for some time. In the 
1980’s research showed that floating garbage was 
accumulating in ocean gyres, i.e. the large circular 
currents that are formed in all oceans as a result of the 
large-scale circulation patterns due to the rotation of the 
planet, and dominating winds. 
In the centre of such gyres, the accumulation of floating 
plastic material, wood and glass may more or less 
cover several thousand square kilometres. Such floating 
debris can cause both physical entanglement of sea 
animals and the accumulation of plastic micro-particles 
in plankton. Another effect is the impacts on certain 
seabirds such as albatrosses that feed on surface floating 
organisms such as squid and shrimps. The birds cannot 
Professor Olof Linden
World Maritime University
“While it may still be possible to distinguish some 
of the floating debris from the tsunami event, 
unfortunately it’s an almost insignificant addition 
to an already huge volume of floating garbage 
which has accumulated in the North Pacific gyre. 
So we should not focus on the tsunami debris 
itself, but use this as an opportunity to raise 
awareness about marine litter in general.”
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distinguish between the feed and floating plastic debris 
of similar size. As a consequence the parent albatrosses 
feed their chicks with an increasing portion of plastic 
material, with serious impacts on the populations of 
these birds. The arrival of unknown but large quantities of 
debris from the tsunami has compounded the problem. 
In mid 2012, Pangaea Explorations, the Algalita Marine 
Research Foundation and the 5 Gyres Institute – 
organizations that specialize in research into plastic 
accumulation in the oceans – are due to conduct 
several expeditions in the Pacific looking for debris from 
the Japan tsunami. 
While there is very little which can now be done to 
prevent the debris from accumulating at sea or washing 
up wherever the currents are going to take it, the media 
and public interest in the fate of floating tsunami debris 
could be used to raise awareness internationally of the 
growing challenge of marine debris.
Tons of debris have been recovered from coastal waters in the Tohoku region
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This unmanned Japanese fishing vessel, Ryo-un Maru, drifted into the Gulf of Alaska in April 2012
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In some instances, vehicles were stacked without having fuel and oil 
removed, creating potential safety and environmental hazards
45
Having visited some of the impacted sites, the UNEP 
expert group was impressed with the speed at which 
the national and regional authorities had initiated the 
post-disaster clean-up effort and with the progress 
achieved in 12 months. 
The Expert Mission team felt that while significant effort 
and resources had been invested by the Japanese 
authorities in dealing with this challenge, there was 
scope for further improvement. A strategic stocktaking 
of the ongoing post-disaster debris management 
operations would help the government to align this work 
with its reconstruction plans, as well as potentially save 
resources and ensure overall environmental benefits.    
The following section outlines some of the key areas 
which should be considered during such an exercise.
1. Waste volume estimations: Estimating the volume of 
disaster debris is an important technical challenge 
facing any authority in the wake of a disaster. 
In order to scope the damage and calibrate the 
response, it is important that a reasonable estimate 
of the disaster debris is available to decision makers 
as quickly as possible. Debris estimates for disasters 
are rarely computed from ground measurements 
as that would be time consuming and potentially 
logistically challenging.  Instead, estimates are 
generally made using satellite imagery or aerial 
photographs. However, in case of tsunamis, this 
approach is complicated by two factors:
a. An unknown quantity of the debris is washed out 
to sea and currently there is no realistic way to 
factor this into calculations of total debris volume; 
and
b. An unknown quantity of soil gets deposited onto 
the land after tsunami and without some ground-
truthing (on-the-ground investigations by experts) 
this cannot be accurately estimated.
 As the overall debris management will be a multi-
billion dollar operation, it is therefore appropriate that 
a re-estimation of the debris volume is undertaken. 
As most of the debris has now been collected and 
stored in controlled areas, such an estimation would 
be practically simple and could be undertaken quite 
quickly.
2. Waste transport: It is best to keep the amount of 
transporting of disaster debris and number of times 
the debris is handled to a minimum.
3. Land reclamation and landfilling: Land reclamation 
and landfilling are waste management options 
which have the potential to rapidly reduce the total 
volume of debris to be handled. When planned 
and implemented efficiently, this can be done in an 
environmentally acceptable and cost effective manner. 
Giving more flexibility to the local municipalities to use 
these options would potentially lower the cost and 
speed-up the reduction of waste volume. 
4. Handling tsunami sediments: As the seawater receded 
after the tsunami, it deposited a large quantity of soil 
on the land. Despite having many such depositions 
in the past which have not deterred long term land 
use, Japanese municipalities are scrapping the 
soil deposited by the tsunami without a plan for its 
final disposal. The decision to recover, move and 
dispose of the deposited soil should be based on an 
analysis of the physical and chemical properties of 
the sediments and an analysis of how the residual soil 
may adversely impact the future land use.
5. Management of hazardous materials: The tsunami 
did not generate large quantities of hazardous 
materials mainly because most of the impacted 
areas were fishing towns or agricultural hubs. The 
main contributors to hazardous debris across most 
or all of the impacted cities were fire extinguishers, 
transformers and pesticides. The fear regarding 
radiation contamination has prevented this debris 
Learning points for Japan
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UNEP hopes to use data from the mission to develop an international protocol for estimating the volume of debris in post-disaster settings
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from being sent to the national hazardous waste 
management centres. As it would not make 
economic or practical sense for each municipality 
to establish its own hazardous waste management 
centre, an appropriate solution would be for 
the impacted municipalities along the coast to 
collaborate and set up a single, shared Integrated 
Hazardous Waste Management area for the 
treatment and safe disposal of tsunami-related 
hazardous waste.
6. Environmental monitoring: While some type of 
monitoring was ongoing at all locations visited by 
the mission team, it was not consistent. Some 
parameters (e.g. radiation) are monitored by the 
respective contractors at each site, while other 
parameters (e.g. asbestos) are being monitored 
by the government agencies off-site. It would be 
more appropriate to have a consistent approach 
to monitoring, specifying the parameters to be 
monitored, the protocols to be used, the frequency 
and external reporting requirements. More credibility 
and consistency could be obtained if the monitoring 
was undertaken by the federal government agency 
responsible for environmental oversight (and not 
the contractor or contract managing department), 
preferably with the support of research institutes.
7. Support to municipalities: While the national 
government is underwriting the financial cost of 
tsunami waste treatment, the size of the debris 
management operation being undertaken in all of 
the municipalities is far beyond what is normally the 
task of municipal-level environment divisions. The 
local municipalities would benefit from a substantially 
increase in technical assistance, monitoring support 
and help with managing large-scale contracting. 
8. Local employment generation: While in-principle there 
is guidance to promote local employment this is not 
being systematically followed through. Partly due to 
the strict deadline given to municipalities to complete 
the post-disaster clean-up, there is a high degree 
of mechanization in the debris handling. If local 
employment generation is deemed a priority, there 
is a lot more opportunity for process optimization to 
maximize employment opportunities.
9. Process optimization: The existing debris management 
centres could be seen as a huge industrial activity 
involving sequential steps with the risk that a 
bottleneck at one stage in the process would limit 
the overall progress. There is scope for reviewing 
the process pipeline at existing centres and any 
new centres, to optimize the throughput by avoiding 
bottlenecks in the interim steps in the process.
48
The incinerator in Sendai was designed, built  
and commissioned in six months
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The approaches to managing the post-disaster debris 
in Japan hold many lessons for similar situations 
elsewhere in the world. While differences in economic 
circumstances, land availability and the sophistication 
of technology mean that not all lessons are easily 
transportable elsewhere, the expert mission team 
concluded that many positive learning points could be 
employed in other countries on a case-by-case basis.
The UNEP expert team concluded that the support from 
the central government to fully underwrite the costs 
associated with the disaster debris management has 
been the core success factor behind Japan’s disaster 
debris management operation. Further lessons from 
the Japan experience which can help inform disaster 
preparedness and post-disaster response efforts for the 
management of debris are as follows. 
● The importance of being prepared: Japan has decades 
of experience in planning for, and responding to, 
disasters. The major municipalities have documented 
plans for disaster debris. This is extremely beneficial 
as allows the government authorities to move 
swiftly into “emergency mode” after a disaster. 
Vulnerable countries should prepare a disaster 
debris management plan as an essential part of their 
national or regional contingency planning.
● Swiftness of response:  Japan’s Ministry of the 
Environment came with a clear guideline for 
the local municipalities on how to deal with the 
disaster debris. This included a guidance note on 
segregation, storage and treatment. This enabled 
the municipalities to have a consistent framework to 
deal with the debris. Individual municipalities trying 
to figure out a sorting strategy would have created 
different waste streams in different municipalities 
making any final consolidation difficult.
● Technical backstopping: Dealing with disaster debris 
is a specialized technical task, something which 
local municipalities, at least the smaller ones, 
generally lack the technical capability to implement. 
Thus providing them only with a guidance note 
would have been inadequate. The decision by the 
Ministry of the Environment to deploy staff from the 
national government to the prefecture and local level 
was a welcome initiative which provided technical 
backstopping to the local experts. 
● Central financial support: The disaster produced such 
vast quantities of debris that the local municipalities 
would never have been able to handle the clean-up 
burden on their own, even during a normal period. 
However, the disaster debris had to be handled at a 
time when their revenue dropped sharply due to the 
destruction of economic activity and the relocation 
of local populations. The national government’s 
decision to fully underwrite the costs associated 
with the disaster debris management has been the 
core factor behind the success of the disaster debris 
management operation in Japan.
Sharing the lessons in 
managing post-disaster debris
Ronnie Crossland
Environmental Protection Agency, USA
“There has been a tremendous effort to remove 
almost all of the loose debris from the field and 
place it in debris management areas.  In order to 
ensure that the progress continues expeditiously, 
the response will need to minimize the number 
of times debris is handled prior to recycling or 
disposal.”
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● Collective contracting: The scope and scale of 
contracts needed for disaster debris management 
was also far beyond the capability of the local 
municipalities. The prefecture governments assisted 
the local municipalities by entering into area-based 
contracting with major Japanese contractors which 
brought in the required scale of resources and 
equipment relatively quickly. Local interests were 
taken care of by joint venture arrangements.
● Health and safety practices: No concessions were 
permitted when dealing with health and safety 
considerations on-site in the affected areas, even 
during the emergency phase. Good health and 
safety practices were being followed at the sites, 
which should ensure that there are minimal or no 
secondary impacts on the staff involved in disaster 
debris management.
● Use of local resources: Efforts to maximize the use of 
local companies to deal with disaster debris either, 
was done when appropriate. This ensures that 
more resources are pumped into the local economy 
while also promoting local ownership and aiding 
the emotional recovery of survivors who get to 
contribute and feel part of the clean-up effort. This is 
yet another practice which should be integrated into 
disaster debris management contingency plans.
Members of the UNEP expert mission team meet Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Koichiro Gemba
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Acronyms and abbreviations
CCA  copper chrome arsenate
cm  centimetres
g  acceleration due to gravity
GIS  Geographic information system
IETC  International Environmental Technology Centre
km  kilometres
m  metres
Mw  moment magnitude
NOAA  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
PCB  polychlorinated biphenyls
t/day  tons per day
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme
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pillars: post-crisis environmental assessment, post-crisis environmental 
recovery, disaster risk reduction and environmental cooperation for 
peacebuilding. The Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch (PCDMB) 
is tasked with coordinating the theme across UNEP.
More information may be obtained from: www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts 
or by email: postconflict@unep.org
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In March 2011, a massive earthquake off the 
north-east coast of Japan triggered a tsunami 
that created an unprecedented volume of 
debris.
The debris management operation which is 
currently ongoing along the Tohoku coast is 
the largest of its kind in the world.
In order to share international experiences in 
disaster debris management and to document 
the lessons from the Japanese experience, 
a UNEP international expert team visited the 
Tohoku area in early 2012.
